At the End of 2025

Abstract

The author, as the president of the Research Council of Wesley College speak about commemorative programs in 2024–2025 were of special importance for celebrating the Holocaust and the antifascist victory; the series’ closing English-language commemoration was held in September 2025. Eighty years have passed since the end of the Second World War; the events marking the war’s end included the atomic bombings, the announcement of Japan’s capitulation and the Japanese instrument of surrender signed aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, as well as the surrenders to the British in Asia. Although the Asian and European conclusions resembled each other in many respects — for example the formation of Soviet and Anglo Saxon spheres of influence and territorial expansion — there were also significant differences. The turning points of Germany’s military collapse occurred in early 1945: the failed German counterattacks in the Ardennes and in the Lake Balaton operations; the mass production of “wonder weapons” proved technically impossible; the possible conflict that might have arisen when Soviet and Anglo Saxon forces met was avoided through cautious political and military measures, with demarcation lines and communication channels established. Germany did indeed collapse militarily. Japan, however, continued to fight, hoping for a compromise or a military solution. In the summer of 1945 the situation did not seem hopeless to Japan because of the size of its forces and its extensive territorial control. The Potsdam ultimatum — demanding Japan’s unconditional surrender — was realistic only because the atomic bomb had been completed. Yet even the destruction of Hiroshima did not break Japan. The tragedy of Nagasaki is the sole responsibility of the Japanese fascist elite, since the leadership was prepared even after the nuclear attack to sacrifice further cities to retain power. In 2025 the author warns that the Russian–Ukrainian war could expand into a Russia–NATO conflict, because Russia is provoking Europe with border violations, cyberattacks, and election interference. If European soldiers or civilians die, that is primarily the consequence of Moscow’s decisions; responsibility also rests with those who encouraged or weakened Europe’s responsive measures. The author highlights the role of civil diplomacy and the Wesley community’s solidarity with Ukraine.