Kant's regressive argument
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59531/ots.2026.4.1.99-105Keywords:
transcendental philosophy, transcendental idealism, circular reasoning, categoriesAbstract
The paper provides an insight into Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy and his approach as presented in his works Critique of Pure Reasen and Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. One of the most significant questions is how to convey Kant's theory of human understanding. This analysis primarily focuses on the question of Kant's method presenting it entirely as an regressive argument following the interpretation of the philosopher W. Röd. Additionaly the paper highlights the peculiar characteristics of transcendental idealism.
References
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